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Abstract
We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Otway-Rees protocol.
More precisely, we show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary active attacks including concurrent
protocol runs if it is implemented using provably secure cryptographic primitives. We prove secrecy
of the exchanged keys with respect to the accepted cryptographic definition of real-or-random secrecy,
i.e., indistinguishability of exchanged keys and random ones, given the view of a general cryptographic
attacker. Although we achieve security under cryptographic definitions, our proof is performed in a
deterministic setting corresponding to a slightly extended Dolev-Yao model; in particular, it does not
have to deal with probabilistic aspects of cryptography and is hence in the scope of current proof tools.
The reason is that we exploit a recently proposed ideal cryptographic library, which has a provably
secure cryptographic implementation, as well as recent results on linking symbolic and cryptographic
key secrecy. Besides establishing the cryptographic security of the Otway-Rees protocol, our result also
exemplifies the potential of this cryptographic library and the recent secrecy preservation theorem for
symbolic yet cryptographically sound proofs of security.
1 Introduction
Many practically relevant cryptographic protocols like SSL/TLS, S/MIME, IPSec, or SET use cryptographic
primitives like signature schemes or encryption in a black-box way, while adding many non-cryptographic
features. Vulnerabilities have accompanied the design of such protocols ever since early authentication
protocols like Needham-Schroeder [54, 36], over carefully designed de-facto standards like SSL and PKCS
[60, 33], up to current widely deployed products like Microsoft Passport [38]. However, proving the security
of such protocols has been a very unsatisfactory task for a long time.
One way to conduct such proofs is the cryptographic approach, whose security definitions are based on
complexity theory, e.g., [40, 39, 41, 30]. The security of a cryptographic protocol is proved by reduction, i.e.,
by showing that breaking the protocol implies breaking one of the underlying cryptographic primitives with
respect to its cryptographic definition. This approach captures a very comprehensive adversary model and
allows for mathematically rigorous and precise proofs. However, because of probabilism and complexity-
theoretic restrictions, these proofs have to be done by hand so far, which yields proofs with faults and
imperfections. Moreover, such proofs rapidly become too complex for larger protocols.
The alternative is the formal-methods approach, which is concerned with the automation of proofs using
model checkers and theorem provers. As these tools currently cannot deal with cryptographic details like
error probabilities and computational restrictions, abstractions of cryptography are used. They are almost
∗Preliminary versions appeared in [4] and [6].
1
always based on the so-called Dolev-Yao model [37]. This model simplifies proofs of larger protocols
considerably and gave rise to a large body of literature on analyzing the security of protocols using various
techniques for formal verification, e.g., [51, 49, 45, 34, 57, 1].
Among the protocols typically analyzed in the Dolev-Yao model, the Otway-Rees protocol [55], which
aims at establishing a shared key between two users by means of a trusted third party, stands out as one
of the most prominent protocols. It has been extensively studied in the past, e.g., in [56, 44, 57], and
various new approaches and formal proof tools for the analysis of security protocols were validated by
showing that they can prove the protocol in the Dolev-Yao model (respectively that they can find the well-
known type-flaw attack if the underlying model does not provide sufficient typing itself; the model that
our proof is based upon excludes this attack). However, all existing proofs of security of the Otway-Rees
protocol are restricted to the Dolev-Yao model, i.e., no theorem exists which allows for carrying over the
results of an existing proof to the cryptographic approach with its much more comprehensive adversary.
Thus, despite the tremendous amount of research dedicated to the Otway-Rees protocol, it is still an open
question whether an actual implementation based on provably secure cryptographic primitives is secure
under cryptographic security definitions. We close this gap by providing the first security proof of the
Otway-Rees protocol in the cryptographic approach. We show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary
active attacks if the Dolev-Yao-based abstraction of symmetric encryption is implemented using a symmetric
encryption scheme that is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks and that additionally ensures integrity of
ciphertexts. More precisely, we prove real-or-random secrecy of the exchanged keys, i.e., we show that
no cryptographic attacker is able to distinguish fresh, random keys and keys that are actually exchanged
between two honest participants unless the underlying cryptography can be broken. This is the accepted
cryptographic definition of key secrecy. Moreover, we show consistency of the protocol in that parties that
have successfully established a shared key have a consistent view of who the peers of the sessions are.1
Chosen-ciphertext security and integrity of ciphertexts are the standard security definition of authenticated
symmetric encryption schemes [32, 31], and efficient symmetric encryptions schemes provably secure in
this sense exist under reasonable assumptions [31, 59].
Obviously, establishing a proof in the cryptographic approach presupposes dealing with the mentioned
cryptographic details, hence one naturally assumes that our proof heavily relies on complexity theory and is
far out of scope of current proof tools. However, our proof is not performed from scratch in the cryptographic
setting, but based on a recently proposed cryptographic library [22, 24, 16], which provides cryptograph-
ically faithful, deterministic abstractions of cryptographic primitives, i.e., the abstractions can be securely
implemented using actual cryptography. Moreover, the library allows for nesting the abstractions in an ar-
bitrary way, quite similar to the original Dolev-Yao model. While this was shown for public-key encryption
and digital signatures in [22] and subsequently extended with message authentication codes in [24], the most
recent extension of the library further incorporated symmetric encryption [16] which constitutes the most
commonly used cryptographic primitive in the typical proofs with Dolev-Yao models, and also serves as the
central primitive for expressing and analyzing the Otway-Rees protocol. However, as shown in [16], there
are intrinsic difficulties in providing a sound abstraction from symmetric encryption in the strong sense of
security used in [22]. Very roughly, a sound Dolev-Yao-style abstraction of symmetric encryption can only
be established if a so-called commitment problem does not occur, which means that whenever a key that is
not known to the adversary is used for encryption by an honest user then this key will never be revealed
to the adversary. We will elaborate on the origin of this problem in more detail in the paper. While [16]
discusses several solutions to this problem, the one actually taken is to leave it to the surrounding protocol
to guarantee that the commitment problem does not occur, i.e., if a protocol that uses symmetric encryption
should be faithfully analyzed, it additionally has to be shown that the protocol guarantees that keys are no
1A violation of this consistency property has been pointed out in [44] which arises due to a different modeling of the trusted
third party. We will discuss this in the following.
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longer sent in a form that might make them known to the adversary once an honest participant has started
using them. Our proof shows that this is a manageable task that can easily be incorporated in the overall
security proof without imposing a major additional burden on the prover.
Once we have shown that the Otway-Rees protocol does not raise the commitment problem, we prove
the security of the Otway-Rees protocol based on the deterministic abstraction. In combination with a
recent result on linking symbolic and cryptographic key secrecy [18], this allows us to perform a symbolic
proof of secrecy for the Otway-Rees protocol and to derive the desired cryptographic key secrecy from that.
Similarly, we establish the consistency property based on the abstraction and exploit a general integrity
preservation theorem [10] to derive the consistency property for the cryptographic setting. As the proof
is deterministic and rigorous, it should be easily expressible in formal proof tools, in particular theorem
provers. Even done by hand, our proof is much less prone to error than a reduction proof conducted from
scratch in the cryptographic approach. We also want to point out that our result not only provides the up-to-
now missing cryptographic security proof of the Otway-Rees protocol, but also exemplifies the usefulness of
the cryptographic library [22], their extensions [24, 16], and the corresponding general theorems for linking
symbolic and cryptographic properties based on this library [10, 21, 14, 15, 18, 5] for the cryptographically
sound verification of cryptographic protocols.
Further Related Work. Cryptographic underpinnings of a Dolev-Yao model were first addressed by
Abadi and Rogaway in [3]. However, they only handled passive adversaries and symmetric encryption.
The protocol language and security properties handled were extended in [2, 46], but still only for passive ad-
versaries. This excludes most of the typical ways of attacking protocols, e.g., man-in-the-middle attacks and
attacks by reusing a message part in a different place or a concurrent protocol run. A full cryptographic jus-
tification for a Dolev-Yao model, i.e., for arbitrary active attacks and within arbitrary surrounding interactive
protocols, was first given recently in [25, 22] with extensions in [24, 16]. Based on the specific Dolev-Yao
model whose soundness was proven in [22], the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol was proved
in [13], a variant of the 3KP payment protocol was proved in [8], and the Yahalom protocol was proven in
[19]. Besides the proof that we present in this paper, the proof in [13, 8, 19] are the only Dolev-Yao-style,
computationally sound proofs that we are aware of. However, they are considerably simpler than the one we
present in this work since it only addresses integrity properties whereas our proof additionally establishes
confidentiality properties; moreover, the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol and the 3KP protocol do not
use symmetric encryption, hence the commitment problem does not occur there which greatly simplifies the
proof. Another cryptographically sound proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol was concurrently
developed by Warinschi [61]. The proof is conducted from scratch in the cryptographic approach which
takes it out of the scope of formal proof tools.
Laud [47] has recently presented a cryptographic underpinning for a Dolev-Yao model of symmetric en-
cryption under active attacks. His work enjoys a direct connection with a formal proof tool, but it is specific
to certain confidentiality properties, restricts the surrounding protocols to straight-line programs in a specific
language, and does not address a connection to the remaining primitives of the Dolev-Yao model. Herzog
et al. [42] and Micciancio and Warinschi [50] have recently also given a cryptographic underpinning under
active attacks. Their results are narrower than that in [22] since they are specific for public-key encryption,
but consider slightly simpler real implementations; moreover, the former relies on a stronger assumption
whereas the latter severely restricts the classes of protocols and protocol properties that can be analyzed
using this primitive. Section 6 of [50] further points out several possible extensions of their work which all
already exist in the earlier work of [22]. Canetti and Herzog [35] have recently linked ideal functionalities
for mutual authentication and key exchange protocols to corresponding representations in a formal language.
They apply their techniques to the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol by considering the exchanged nonces
as secret keys. Their work is restricted to the mentioned functionalities and in contrast to the cryptographic
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library [22] hence does not address soundness of Dolev-Yao models in their usual generality. The consid-
ered language does not allow loops and offers public-key encryption as the only cryptographic operation.
Moreover, their approach to define a mapping between ideal and real traces following the ideas of [50] only
captures trace-based properties (i.e., integrity properties); reasoning about secrecy properties additionally
requires ad-hoc and functionality-specific arguments. Since computational soundness has become a highly
active line of research, we exemplarily list further recent results in this area without going into further details
[11, 23, 27, 20, 9, 17, 7, 29, 12].
Efforts are also under way to formulate syntactic calculi for dealing with probabilism and polynomial-
time considerations, in particular [52, 48, 53, 43] and, as a second step, to encode them into proof tools. This
approach can not yet handle protocols with any degree of automation. It is complementary to the approach
of proving simple deterministic abstractions of cryptography and working with those wherever cryptography
is only used in a blackbox way.
Outline. Section 2 introduces the notation used in the paper and briefly reviews the aforementioned cryp-
tographic library. Section 3 shows how to model the Otway-Rees protocol based on this library as well as
how initially shared keys can be represented in the underlying model. Section 4 contains the symbolic and
cryptographic security properties of the Otway-Rees protocol. The symbolic property is proven in Section 5,
and Section 6 shows how to derive the cryptographic property for the cryptographic implementation of the
protocol. Section 7 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we give an overview of the ideal cryptographic library of [22, 24, 16] and briefly sketch its
provably secure implementation. We start by introducing the notation used in this paper.
2.1 Notation
Let ↓ denote an error element available as an addition to the domains and ranges of all functions and algo-
rithms. The list operation is denoted as l := (x1, . . . , xj), and the arguments are unambiguously retrievable
as l[i], with l[i] = ↓ if i > j. A database D is a set of functions, called entries, each over a finite domain
called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D, the value at an attribute att is written x.att . For a predicate pred
involving attributes, D[pred ] means the subset of entries whose attributes fulfill pred . If D[pred ] contains
only one element, we use the same notation for this element.
2.2 Overview of the Ideal and Real Cryptographic Library
The ideal (abstract) cryptographic library of [22, 24, 16] offers its users abstract cryptographic operations,
such as commands to encrypt or decrypt a message, to make or test a signature, and to generate a nonce.
All these commands have a simple, deterministic semantics. To allow a reactive scenario, this semantics
is based on state, e.g., of who already knows which terms; the state is represented as a database. Each
entry has a type (e.g., “ciphertext”), and pointers to its arguments (e.g., a key and a message). Further,
each entry contains handles for those participants who already know it. A send operation makes an entry
known to other participants, i.e., it adds handles to the entry. The ideal cryptographic library does not allow
cheating. For instance, if it receives a command to encrypt a message m with a certain key, it simply makes
an abstract database entry for the ciphertext. Another user can only ask for decryption of this ciphertext if
he has obtained handles to both the ciphertext and the secret key.
To allow for the proof of cryptographic faithfulness, the library is based on a detailed model of asyn-
chronous reactive systems introduced in [58, 28] and represented as a deterministic machine THH, called
trusted host. The parameter H ⊆ {1 . . . , n} denotes the honest participants, where n is a parameter of the
library denoting the overall number of participants. Depending on the considered set H, the trusted host
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offers slightly extended capabilities for the adversary. However, for current purposes, the trusted host can
be seen as a slightly modified Dolev-Yao model together with a network and intruder model, similar to “the
CSP Dolev-Yao model” or “the inductive-approach Dolev-Yao model”.
The real cryptographic library offers its users the same commands as the ideal one, i.e., honest users
operate on cryptographic objects via handles. The objects are now real cryptographic keys, ciphertexts, etc.,
handled by real distributed machines. Sending a term on an insecure channel releases the actual bitstring
to the adversary, who can do with it what he likes. The adversary can also insert arbitrary bitstrings on
non-authentic channels. The implementation of the commands is based on arbitrary secure encryption and
signature systems according to standard cryptographic definitions, with certain additions like type tagging
and additional randomizations.
The security proof of [22] states that the real library is at least as secure as the ideal library. This is
captured using the notion of reactive simulatability [58, 28], which states that whatever an adversary can
achieve in the real implementation, another adversary can achieve given the ideal library, or otherwise the
underlying cryptography can be broken. This is the strongest possible cryptographic relationship between a
real and an ideal system. In particular it covers arbitrary active attacks. Moreover, a composition theorem
exists in the underlying model [58, 26], which states that one can securely replace the ideal library in larger
systems with the real library, i.e., without destroying the already established simulatability relation.
2.3 Detailed Description of the State of the Cryptographic Library
We conclude this section with the rigorous definition of the state of the ideal cryptographic library. A
rigorous definition of the commands of the ideal library used for modeling the Otway-Rees protocol as
well as local adversary commands that model the slightly extended adversary capabilities can be found
in [22, 16].
The machine THH has ports inu? and outu ! for inputs from and outputs to each user u ∈ H and for u =
a, denoting the adversary. The notation follows the CSP convention, e.g., the cryptographic library obtains
messages at inu? that have been output at inu !. Besides the number n of users, the ideal cryptographic library
is parameterized by a tuple L of length functions which are used to calculate the “length” of an abstract
entry, corresponding to the length of the corresponding bitstring in the real implementation. Moreover, L
contains bounds on the message lengths and the number of accepted inputs at each port. These bounds can
be arbitrarily large, but have to be polynomially bounded in the security parameter.
Using the notation of [22], the ideal cryptographic library is a system Syscry,idn,L that consists of several
structures ({THH},SH), one for each value of the parameterH. Each structure consists of a set of machines,
here only containing the single machine THH, and a set SH := {inu?, outu ! | u ∈ H} denoting those ports of
THH that the honest users connect to. Formally, we obtain Syscry,idn,L := {({THH},SH) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}.
In the following, we omit the parameters n and L for simplicity.2
The main data structure of THH is a database D. The entries of D are abstract representations of the
data produced during a system run, together with the information on who knows these data. Each entry in
D is of the form (recall the notation in Section 2.1)
(ind , type , arg , hndu1 , . . . , hndum , hnd a, len)
where H = {u1, . . . , um}. For each entry x ∈ D:
• x.ind ∈ INDS, called index, consecutively numbers all entries in D. The set INDS is isomorphic
to N and is used to distinguish index arguments from others. The index is used as a primary key
attribute of the database, i.e., we write D[i] for the selection D[ind = i].
2Formally, these parameters are thus also parameters of the ideal Otway-Rees system SysOR,id that we introduce in Section 3.2.
5
• x.type ∈ typeset identifies the type of x.
• x.arg = (a1, a2, . . . , aj) is a possibly empty list of arguments. Many values ai are indices of other
entries in D and thus in INDS. We sometimes distinguish them by a superscript “ind”.
• x.hndu ∈ HNDS∪{↓} for u ∈ H∪{a} are handles by which a user or adversary u knows this entry.
x.hndu = ↓ means that u does not know this entry. The set HNDS is yet another set isomorphic to
N. We always use a superscript “hnd” for handles.
• x.len ∈ N0 denotes the “length” of the entry; it is computed by applying the functions from L.
Initially, D is empty. THH has a counter size ∈ INDS for the current size of D. For the handle attributes,
it has counters curhndu (current handle) initialized with 0.
3 The Otway-Rees Protocol
The Otway-Rees protocol [55] is a four-step protocol for establishing a shared secret encryption key between
two users. The protocol relies on a distinguished trusted third party T, i.e., T 6∈ {1, . . . , n}, and it is assumed
that every user u initially shares a secret key Kut with T. Expressed in the typical protocol notation, the
Otway-Rees protocol works as follows.3
1. u→ v : M, (Nu,M, u, v)Kut
2. v → T : M, (Nu,M, u, v)Kut , (Nv ,M, u, v)Kvt
3. T→ v : M, (Nu,Kuv)Kut , (Nv ,Kuv)Kvt
4. v → u : M, (Nu,Kuv)Kut .
3.1 Capturing Distributed Keys in the Abstract Library
In order to capture that keys shared between users and the trusted third party have already been generated
and distributed, we assume that suitable entries for the keys already exist in the database. We denote the
handle of u to the secret key shared with v, where either u ∈ {1, . . . , n} and v = T or vice versa, as
sksehndu,v . More formally, we start with an initially empty database D, and for each user u ∈ H two entries of
the following form are added (the first one being a public-key identifier for the actual secret key as described
below in more detail):
(ind := pkseu , type := pkse, arg := (), len := 0);
(ind := skseu , type := skse, arg := (ind − 1),
hndu := skse
hnd
u,T, hndT := skse
hnd
T,u, len := skse len
∗(k)).
Here pkseu and skseu are two consecutive natural numbers; treating public-key identifiers as being of length
0 is a technicality in the proof of [16], and skse len∗(k) denotes the abstract length of the secret key. These
lengths will not matter in the following.
The first entry has to be incorporated in order to reflect special capabilities that the adversary may
have with respect to symmetric encryption schemes in the real world. For instance it must be possible
for an adversary against the ideal library to check whether encryptions have been created with the same
secret key since the definition of symmetric encryption schemes does not exclude this and it can hence
3For simplicity, we omit the explicit inclusion of u and v in the unencrypted part of the first and second message since the
cryptographic library already provides the identity of the (claimed) sender of a message, which is sufficient for our purpose.
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Figure 1: Overview of the Otway-Rees Ideal System.
happen in the real system. For public-key encryption, this was achieved in [22] by tagging ciphertexts with
the corresponding public key so that the public keys can be compared. For symmetric encryption, this is
not possible as no public key exists, hence this problem is solved by tagging abstract ciphertexts with an
otherwise meaningless “public key” solely used as an identifier for the secret key. Note that the argument of
a secret key points to its key identifier. In the following, public-key identifiers will not matter any further.
We omit the details of how these entries for user u are added by a command gen symenc key, followed
by a command send s for sending the secret key over a secure channel.
3.2 The Otway-Rees Protocol Using the Abstract Library
We now model the Otway-Rees protocol in the framework of [58] and using the ideal cryptographic library.
For each user u ∈ {1, . . . , n} we define a machine MORu , called a protocol machine, which executes the
protocol sketched above for participant identity u. It is connected to its user via ports KS outu !, KS inu?
(“KS” for “Key Sharing”) and to the cryptographic library via ports inu !, outu?. We further model the
trusted third party as a machine MORT . It does not connect to any users and is connected to the cryptographic
library via ports inT!, outT?. The combination of the protocol machines MORu , the trusted third party MORT ,
and the trusted host THH is the ideal Otway-Rees system SysOR,id. It is shown in Figure 1; H and A model
the arbitrary joint honest users and the adversary, respectively.
Using the notation of [22], we have SysOR,id := {(MˆH,SH) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}, cf. the definition
of the ideal cryptographic library in Section 2.3, where MˆH := {THH} ∪ {MORu | u ∈ H ∪ {T}} and
SH := {KS inu?,KS outu ! | u ∈ H}, i.e., for a given set H of honest users, only the protocol machines
MORu with u ∈ H are actually present in a protocol run. The others are subsumed in the adversary.
The state of the protocol machine MORu consists of the bitstring u and a set Nonceu of pairs of the form
(nhnd,mhnd, v, j), where nhnd,mhnd are handles, v ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Intuitively, a pair
(nhnd,mhnd, v, j) states that MORu generated the handle nhnd in the j-th step of the protocol in a session run
with v and session identifier mhnd. The set Nonceu is initially empty. The trusted third party MORT maintains
an initially empty set SIDT to store already processed session IDs.
We now define how the protocol machine MORu evaluates inputs. They either come from user u at port
KS inu? or from THH at port outu?. The behavior of MORu in both cases is described in Algorithm 1 and 3
respectively, which we will describe below. The trusted third party MORT only receives inputs from the
cryptographic library, and its behavior is described in Algorithm 2. We refer to Step i of Algorithm j as
Step j.i. All three algorithms should immediately abort if a command to the cryptographic library does not
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Algorithm 1 Evaluation of Inputs from the User (Protocol Start)
Input: (new prot,Otway Rees, v) at KS inu? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}.
1: nhndu ← gen nonce().
2: IDhnd ← gen nonce().
3: Nonceu := Nonceu ∪ {(nhndu , ID
hnd, v, 1)}.
4: uhnd ← store(u).
5: vhnd ← store(v).
6: lhnd1 ← list(n
hnd
u , ID
hnd, uhnd, vhnd).
7: chnd1 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
u,T, l
hnd
1 ).
8: mhnd1 ← list(ID
hnd, chnd1 ).
9: send i(v,mhnd1 ).
yield the desired result, e.g., if a decryption requests fails. For readability we omit these abort checks in the
algorithm descriptions; instead we impose the following convention on all three algorithms.
Convention 1 For all w ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∪ {T} the following holds. If MORw enters a command at port inw !
and receives ↓ at port outw? as the immediate answer of the cryptographic library, then MORw aborts the
execution of the current algorithm, except if the command was of the form list proj or send i.
Protocol start. The user of the protocol machine MORu can start a new protocol with user v ∈ {1, . . . , n}\
{u} by inputting (new prot,Otway Rees, v) at port KS inu?. Our security proof holds for all adversaries
and all honest users, i.e., especially those that start protocols with the adversary (respectively a malicious
user) in parallel with protocols with honest users. Upon such an input, MORu builds up the term corresponding
to the first protocol message using the ideal cryptographic library according to Algorithm 1. The command
gen nonce generates the ideal nonce as well as the session identifier. MORu stores the resulting handles nhndu
and mhnd in Nonceu for future comparison together with the identity of v and an indicator that these handles
were generated in the first step of the protocol. The command store inputs arbitrary application data into
the cryptographic library, here the user identities u and v. The command list forms a list and sym encrypt
is symmetric encryption. The final command send i means that MORu sends the resulting term to v over an
insecure channel. The effect is that the adversary obtains a handle to the term and can decide what to do
with it (such as forwarding it to MORv ).
Evaluation of network inputs for protocol machines. The behavior of the protocol machine MORu upon
receiving an input from the cryptographic library at port outu? (corresponding to a message that arrives
over the network) is defined similarly in Algorithm 3. By construction of THH, such an input is always
of the form (v, u, i,mhnd) where mhnd is a handle to a list. To increase readability, and to clarify the
connection between the algorithmic description and the usual protocol notation, we augment the algorithm
with explanatory comments at its right-hand side to depict which handle corresponds to which Dolev-Yao
term. We further use the naming convention that ingoing and outgoing messages are labeled m, where
outgoing messages have an additional subscript corresponding to the protocol step. Encryptions are labeled
c, the encrypted lists are labeled l, both with suitable sub- and superscripts.
MORu first determines the session identifier and aborts if it is not of type nonce. MORu then checks if
the obtained message could correspond to the first, third, or fourth step of the protocol. (Recall that the
second step is only performed by T.) This is implemented by looking up the session identifier in the set
Nonceu. After that, MORu checks if the obtained message is indeed a suitably constructed message for the
particular step and the particular session ID by exploiting the contents of Nonceu. If so, MORu constructs a
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Algorithm 2 Behavior of the Trusted Third Party
Input: (v,T, i,mhnd) at outT? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
1: IDhnd ← list proj(mhnd, 1). {IDhnd ≈M}
2: type1 ← get type(ID
hnd).
3: c(3)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 3). {c(3)
hnd
≈ {Nv,M, u, v}Kvt}
4: l(3)
hnd
← sym decrypt(sksehndT,v , c
(3)hnd). {l(3)
hnd
≈ {Nv,M, u, v}}
5: yhndi ← list proj(l
(3)hnd , i) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
6: yi ← retrieve(yhndi ) for i = 3, 4.
7: if (IDhnd ∈ SIDT) ∨ (type1 6= nonce) ∨ (yhnd2 6= IDhnd) ∨ (y3 6∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {v}) ∨ (y4 6= v) then
8: Abort
9: end if
10: SIDT := SIDT ∪ {IDhnd}.
11: c(2)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 2). {c(2)
hnd
≈ {Nu,M, u, v}Kut}
12: l(2)
hnd
← sym decrypt(sksehndT,y3 , c
(2)hnd). {l(2)
hnd
≈ {Nu,M, u, v}}
13: xhndi ← list proj(l
(2)hnd , i) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
14: type2 ← get type(x
hnd
1 ).
15: xi ← retrieve(xhndi ) for i = 3, 4.
16: if (type2 6= nonce) ∨ (xhnd2 6= yhnd2 ) ∨ (x3 6= y3) ∨ (x4 6= y4) then
17: Abort
18: end if
19: sksehnd ← gen symenc key(). {sksehnd ≈ Kuv}
20: l(2)
hnd
3 ← list(x
hnd
1 , skse
hnd). {l
(2)hnd
3 ≈ {Nu,Kuv}}
21: c(2)
hnd
3 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
T,y3
, l
(2)hnd
3 ). {c
(2)hnd
3 ≈ {Nu,Kuv}Kut}
22: l(3)
hnd
3 ← list(y
hnd
1 , skse
hnd). {l
(3)hnd
3 ≈ {Nv ,Kuv}}
23: c(3)
hnd
3 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
T,v , l
(3)hnd
3 ). {c
(3)hnd
3 ≈ {Nv,Kuv}Kvt}
24: mhnd3 ← list(ID
hnd, c
(2)hnd
3 , c
(3)hnd
3 ). {m
hnd
3 ≈M, {Nu,Kuv}Kut, {Nv ,Kuv}Kvt}
25: send i(v,mhnd3 ).
message according to the protocol description, sends it to the intended recipient, updates the set Nonceu,
and possibly signals to its user that a key has been successfully shared with another user.
Behavior of the trusted third party. The behavior of MORT upon receiving an input (v,T, i,mhnd) from
the cryptographic library at port outT? is defined similarly in Algorithm 2. We omit an informal description.
3.3 On Polynomial Runtime
In order to use existing composition results of the underlying model, the protocol machines MORw and MORT
must be polynomial-time. Similar to the cryptographic library, we define that each of these machines main-
tains explicit polynomial bounds on the message lengths and the number of inputs accepted at each port.
4 The Security Property
In the following, we formalize the security property of the ideal and real Otway-Rees protocols. The property
consists of a key secrecy property and a consistency property. We first formalize the ideal key secrecy
property which is an instantiation of a general key secrecy definition for arbitrary protocols based on the
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Algorithm 3 Evaluation of Inputs from THH (Network Inputs)
Input: (v, u, i,mhnd) at outu? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}.
1: IDhnd ← list proj(mhnd, 1). {IDhnd ≈M}
2: type1 ← get type(ID
hnd).
3: if type1 6= nonce then
4: Abort
5: end if
6: if v 6= T ∧ ∀j, nhnd : (nhnd, IDhnd, v, j)} 6∈ Nonceu then {First Message is input}
7: c(2)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 2). {c(2)
hnd
≈ (Nv,M, v, u)Kvt}
8: nhndu ← gen nonce().
9: Nonceu := Nonceu ∪ {(nhndu , ID
hnd, v, 2)}.
10: uhnd ← store(u).
11: vhnd ← store(v).
12: l(3)
hnd
2 ← list(n
hnd
u , ID
hnd, vhnd, uhnd). {l
(3)hnd
2 ≈ Nu,M, v, u}
13: c(3)
hnd
2 ← sym encrypt(skse
hnd
u,T, l
(3)hnd
2 ). {c
(3)hnd
2 ≈ (Nu,M, v, u)Kut}
14: mhnd2 ← list(ID
hnd, c(2)
hnd
, c
(3)hnd
2 ). {m
hnd
2 ≈M, (Nv ,M, v, u)Kvt , (Nu,M, v, u)Kut}
15: send i(T,mhnd2 ).
16: else if v = T then {Third Message is input}
17: c(2)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 2). {c(2)
hnd
≈ (Nv,Kuv)Kvt}
18: c(3)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 3). {c(3)
hnd
≈ (Nu,Kuv)Kut}
19: l(3)
hnd
← sym decrypt(sksehndu,T, c
(3)hnd). {l(3)
hnd
≈ Nu,Kuv}
20: yhndi ← list proj(l
(3)hnd , i) for i = 1, 2.
21: type2 ← get type(y
hnd
2 ).
22: if (6 ∃!w ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u} : (yhnd1 , IDhnd, w, 2) ∈ Nonceu) ∨ (type2 6= skse) then
23: Abort
24: end if
25: Nonceu := (Nonceu \ {(yhnd1 , ID
hnd, w, 2)}) ∪ {(yhnd1 , ID
hnd, w, 3)}.
26: mhnd4 ← list(ID
hnd, c(2)
hnd
). {mhnd4 ≈M, {Nv ,Kuv}Kvt}
27: send i(w,mhnd4 ).
28: Output (ok responder,Otway Rees, w, IDhnd, yhnd2 ) at KS outu !.
29: else if v 6= T ∧ ∃!nhnd : (nhnd, IDhnd, v, 1) then {Fourth Message is input}
30: c(2)
hnd
← list proj(mhnd, 2). {c(2)
hnd
≈ {Nu,Kuv}Kut}
31: l(2)
hnd
← sym decrypt(sksehndu,T, c
(2)hnd). {l(2)
hnd
≈ {Nu,Kuv}}
32: xhndi ← list proj(l
(2)hnd , i) for i = 1, 2.
33: type3 ← get type(x
hnd
2 ).
34: if xhnd1 6= nhnd ∨ type3 6= skse then
35: Abort
36: end if
37: Nonceu := (Nonceu \ {(xhnd1 , ID
hnd, v, 1)}) ∪ {(xhnd1 , ID
hnd, v, 4)}.
38: Output (ok initiator,Otway Rees, v, IDhnd, xhnd2 ) at KS outu !.
39: else
40: Abort
41: end if
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ideal cryptographic library. It was introduced in [18] and is symbolic, based on the typical notion that a term
is not an element of the adversary’s knowledge set. In the given Dolev-Yao-style library, the adversary’s
knowledge set is the set of all terms to which the adversary has a handle. After that we introduce the notion
of cryptographic, real-or-random key secrecy based on the real cryptographic library. Finally, we express
the consistency property, and we distinguish perfect and computational fulfillment of the property.
4.1 Definition of the Key Secrecy Property
The first step towards defining symbolic key secrecy is to consider one state of the ideal Dolev-Yao-style
library and to define that a handle points to a symmetric key, that the key is symbolically unknown to the
adversary, and that it has not been used for encryption. These are the symbolic conditions under which
we can hope to prove that the corresponding real key is indistinguishable from a fresh random key for the
adversary. Note that the operations that the Otway-Rees protocol performs on new keys are allowed in this
sense. For Condition (3) in the definition, note that the arguments of a ciphertext term are (l, pk ) where l is
the plaintext index and pk the index of the public tag of the secret key, with pk = sk − 1 for the secret key
index.
Definition 4.1 (Symbolically Secret Encryption Keys [18]) Let {T} ⊆ H ⊆ {1, . . . , n,T}, a database state
D of THH, and a pair (u, lhnd) ∈ H × HNDS of a user and a handle be given. Let i := D[hndu =
lhnd].ind be the corresponding database index. The term under (u, lhnd) (1) is a symmetric encryption key
iff D[i].type = skse, (2) is symbolically unknown (to the adversary) iff D[i].hnd a = ↓, (3) has not been used
for encryption, or short is unused, iff for all indices j ∈ N we have D[j].type = symenc ⇒ D[j].arg [2] 6=
i− 1, and (4) is a symbolically secret key iff it has the three previous properties. ✸
A secret-key belief function is a general way to designate the keys whose secrecy should be proved. The
underlying theory from [18] is based on such functions. We instantiate them for the Otway-Rees protocol
and thus essentially for all individual key exchange protocols. A secret key belief function maps the user
view to a set of triples (u, lhnd, t) of a user, a handle, and a type, pointing to the supposedly secret keys. For
the Otway-Rees protocol, we define secret-key belief functions seckeys initiator OR for the initiator and
seckeys responder OR for the responder that designate the exchanged keys.
Definition 4.2 (Secret-key Belief Functions for the Otway-Rees Protocol) A secret-key belief function for a
setH is a function seckeys that maps each view view of the user to an element of (H×HNDS×{skse})∗.
The secret-key belief functions seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR of the Otway-
Rees protocol map each element (ok initiator,Otway Rees, v, IDhnd, sksehnd) respectively
(ok responder,Otway Rees, v, IDhnd, sksehnd) of view arriving at port KE outu? in the users view
to (u, sksehnd, skse) if u ∈ H, and to ǫ otherwise. Elements of view that are not of this form are also
mapped to ǫ. ✸
We now define symbolic key secrecy for such a function. In addition to the conditions for individual keys,
we require that all elements point to different terms, so that we can expect the corresponding list of crypto-
graphic keys to be entirely random.
Definition 4.3 (Symbolic Key Secrecy Generally and for the Otway-Rees Protocol) Let a user H suitable for
a structure ({THH},SH) of the cryptographic library Syscry,id and a secret-key belief function seckeys for
H be given. The ideal cryptographic library with this user keeps the keys in seckeys strictly symbolically
secret iff for all configurations conf = ({THH},SH,H,A) of this structure, every v ∈ viewconf (H), and
every element (ui, lhndi , ti) of the set seckeys(v), the term under (ui, lhndi ) is a symbolically secret key of
type ti, and D[hndui = lhndi ].ind 6= D[hnduj = lhndj ].ind for all i 6= j.
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The ideal Otway-Rees protocol keeps the exchanged keys of honest users strictly symbolically secret iff
the ideal cryptographic library keeps the keys in seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR strictly
symbolically secret with all users H∗ that are the combination of the machines MORu for u ∈ H and a user H
of those machines. ✸
General cryptographic key secrecy requires that no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish the keys
designated by the function seckeys from fresh keys. The cryptographic key secrecy of the Otway-Rees
protocol is the instantiation for seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR and the configurations of
the Otway-Rees protocol.
Definition 4.4 (Cryptographic (Real-or-random) Key Secrecy Generally and for the Otway-Rees Protocol)
Let a polynomial-time configuration conf = (MˆH,SH,H,A) of the real cryptographic library Syscry,realSE
and a secret-key belief function seckeys for H be given. Let genSE denote the key generation algorithm.
This configuration keeps the keys in seckeys cryptographically secret iff for all probabilistic-polynomial
time algorithms Dis (the distinguisher), we have
|Pr[Dis(1k, va, keysreal ) = 1]− Pr[Dis(1
k, va, keysfresh ) = 1]| ∈ NEGL
where NEGL denotes the negligible function of the security parameter k and the used random variables
are defined as follows: For r ∈ runconf , let va := viewconf (A)(r) be the view of the adversary, let
(ui, l
hnd
i , ti)i=1,...,n := seckeys(viewconf (H)(r)) be the user-handle-type triples of presumably secret keys,
and let the keys be keysreal := (ski )i=1,...,n with
ski := Dui [hndui = l
hnd
i ].word if Dui [hndui = lhndi ].type = ti, else ǫ;
and keysfresh := (sk ′i )i=1,...,n with sk ′i ← genA(1k) if ti = ska, else sk ′i ← ǫ.
A polynomial-time configuration (MˆH ∪ {MORu | u ∈ H},SH,H,A) of the real Otway-Rees protocol
SysOR,real keeps the exchanged keys of honest users cryptographically secret iff the configuration (MˆH,SH,
{H} ∪ {MORu | u ∈ H},A) keeps the keys in seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR cryptograph-
ically secret. ✸
4.2 Definition of the Consistency Property
The consistency property states that if two honest users establish a session key then both need to have
a consistent view of who the peers to the session are, i.e., if an honest user u establishes a key with v,
and v establishes the same key with another user w, then u has to equal w. Moreover, we incorporate the
correctness of the protocol into the consistency property, i.e., if the aforementioned outputs occur and u = w
holds, then both parties have obtained the same key.4 In the following definitions, we write t : D to denote
the contents of database D at time t, and t : p?m and t : p!m to denote that message m occurs at input port
respectively output port p at time t.
The consistency property ReqCons is formally captured as follows: Assume that outputs
(ok initiator,Otway Rees, v, IDhndu , skse
hnd
u ) and (ok responder,Otway Rees, w, IDhndv , sksehndv ) occur at
KS outu ! respectively at KS outv ! at arbitrary times t1 and t2 for honest users u and v such that the session
identifiers are the same, i.e., t1 : D[hndu = IDhndu ] = t2 : D[hndv = IDhndv ]. Then the handles sksehndu and
sksehndv point to the same entry in the database, i.e., t1 : D[hndu = sksehndu ] = t2 : D[hndv = sksehndv ] if
and only if u = w. The formal definition of ReqCons is given in Figure 2.
4A violation of this correctness aspect has been pointed out in [44] which arises since in their modeling the trusted third party
creates multiple keys if it is repeatedly triggered with the same message. We explicitly excluded this in our definition of the trusted
third party by storing the session IDs processed so far, cf. Step 7 and 10 in Algorithm 2.
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∀u, v ∈ H,∀t1, t2 ∈ N : # For all honest users u and v:
t1 : KS outu !(ok initiator,Otway Rees, v , ID
hnd
u , skse
hnd
u ) ∧ # if u shares a key with v
t2 : KS outv !(ok responder,Otway Rees,w , ID
hnd
v , skse
hnd
v ) ∧ # and v shares a key with w
t1 : D[hndu = ID
hnd
u ] = t2 : D[hndv = ID
hnd
v ] # and the sessions are equal
⇒ (u = w ⇔ # then u is equal to w iff
t1 : D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ] = t2 : D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ]) # both keys are equal.
Figure 2: The Consistency Property ReqCons.
Note that the consistency property ReqCons specifically relies on the state of THH, hence it cannot be
used as is to capture the security of the real Otway-Rees system, where THH is replaced with the secure
implementation of the cryptographic library. The corresponding consistency property ReqConsreal for the real
Otway-Rees system can be defined by requiring that both handles point to the same bitstring, i.e., by re-
placing t1 : D[hndu = sksehndu ] = t2 : D[hndv = sksehndv with t1 : Du[hndu = sksehndu ].word = t2 :
Dv[hndv = skse
hnd
v ].word for the databases Du and Dv of the real library.
The notion of a system Sys fulfilling such a property Req essentially comes in two flavors [10]. Perfect
fulfillment, Sys |=perf Req , means that the property holds with probability one (over the probability spaces
of runs, a well-defined notion from the underlying model [58]) for all honest users and for all adversaries.
Computational fulfillment, Sys |=poly Req , means that the property only holds for polynomially bounded
users and adversaries, and only with negligible error probability. Perfect fulfillment implies computational
fulfillment.
The following theorem captures the security of the Otway-Rees protocol.
Theorem 4.1 (Security of the Otway-Rees Protocol) Let SysOR,id and SysOR,real be the ideal and real
Otway-Rees system, respectively, as defined in Section 3.2. Then we have:
• Secrecy: SysOR,id keeps the exchanged keys of honest users strictly symbolically secret, and all
polynomial-time configurations of SysOR,real keep the exchanged keys of honest users cryptographi-
cally secret.
• Consistency: SysOR,id perfectly fulfills the consistency property ReqCons, and SysOR,real computation-
ally fulfills the consistency property ReqConsreal , i.e., SysOR,id |=perf ReqCons∧SysOR,real |=poly ReqConsreal .
✷
5 Proof in the Ideal Setting
This section contains the proof of the ideal part of Theorem 4.1, i.e., the proof of the Otway-Rees protocol
using the ideal, deterministic cryptographic library. The proof idea is the following: If an honest user u
successfully terminates a session run with another honest user v, then we first show that the established
key has been created before by the trusted third party. After that, we exploit that the trusted third party as
well as all honest users may only send this key within an encryption generated with a key shared between
u and T respectively v and T, and we conclude that the adversary hence never gets a handle to the key.
The main challenge was to find suitable invariants on the state of the ideal Otway-Rees system. This is
somewhat similar to formal proofs using the Dolev-Yao model, and the similarity supports our hope that the
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new, sound cryptographic library can be used in the place of the Dolev-Yao models in automated tools. The
proof of the invariants is postponed to Appendix A.
5.1 Invariants
The first invariants, correct nonce owner and unique nonce use, are easily proved and essentially state that
handles xhnd where (xhnd, ·, ·, ·) is contained in a set Nonceu indeed point to entries of type nonce, and
that no nonce is in two such sets. The next two invariants, nonce secrecy and nonce-list secrecy, deal with
the secrecy of certain terms. They are mainly needed to prove the invariant correct list generation, which
establishes who created certain terms. The last invariant, key secrecy, states that the adversary never learns
keys created by the trusted third party for use between honest users.
• Correct Nonce Owner. For all u ∈ H, and for all (xhnd, ·, ·, ·) ∈ Nonceu, it holds D[hndu = xhnd] 6=
↓ and D[hndu = xhnd].type = nonce.
• Unique Nonce Use. For all u, v ∈ H, all w,w′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all j ≤ size: If
(D[j].hndu , ·, w, ·) ∈ Nonceu and (D[j].hndv , ·, w′, ·) ∈ Noncev, then (u,w) = (v,w′).
Nonce secrecy states that the nonces exchanged between honest users u and v remain secret from all other
users and from the adversary. For the formalization, note that the handles xhnd to these nonces are contained
as elements (xhnd, ·, v, ·) in the set Nonceu. The claim is that the other users and the adversary have no
handles to such a nonce in the database D of THH:
• Nonce Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and for all j ≤ size: If (D[j].hndu , ·, v, ·) ∈ Nonceu then
D[j].hndw 6= ↓ implies w ∈ {u, v,T}. In particular, this means D[j].hnd a = ↓.
Similarly, the invariant nonce-list secrecy states that a list containing such a handle can only be known to
u, v, and T. Further, it states that the identity fields in such lists are correct. Moreover, if such a list is an
argument of another entry, then this entry is an encryption created with the secret key that either u or v share
with T. (Formally this means that this entry is tagged with the corresponding public-key identifier as an
abstract argument, cf. Section 3.1.)
• Nonce-List Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and for all j ≤ size with D[j].type = list: Let x indi :=
D[j].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. If (D[x ind1 ].hndu , ·, v, l) ∈ Nonceu then
a) D[j].hndw 6= ↓ implies w ∈ {u, v,T} for l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
b) If l ∈ {1, 4} and D[x ind3 ].type = data, then D[x ind3 ].arg = (u) and D[x ind4 ].arg = (v).
c) If l ∈ {2, 3} and D[x ind3 ].type = data, then D[x ind3 ].arg = (v) and D[x ind4 ].arg = (u).
d) for l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and for all k ≤ size it holds j ∈ D[k].arg only if D[k].type = symenc and
D[k].arg [1] ∈ {pkseu, pksev}.
The invariant correct list owner states that certain protocol messages can only be constructed by the “in-
tended” users respectively by the trusted third party.
• Correct List Owner. For all u, v ∈ H and for all j ≤ size with D[j].type = list: Let x indi :=
D[j].arg [i] for i = 1, 2 and xhnd1,u := D[x ind1 ].hndu .
a) If (xhnd1,u , ·, v, l) ∈ Nonceu and D[x ind2 ].type 6= skse, then D[j] was created by MORu in Step 1.6
if l = 1 and in Step 3.12 if l = 2.
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b) If (xhnd1,u , IDhndu , v, l) ∈ Nonceu and D[x ind2 ].type = skse, then D[j] was created by MORT in
Step 2.22 if l = 3 and in Step 2.20 if l = 4. Moreover, we have D[hndu = IDhndu ] = D[hndT =
IDhndT ], where IDhndT denotes the handle that T obtained in Step 2.1 in the same execution.
Finally, the invariant key secrecy states that a secret key entry that has been generated by the trusted third
party to be shared between honest users u and v can only be known to u, v, and T. In particular, the
adversary will never get a handle to it. This invariant is key for proving the secrecy and the consistency
property of the Otway-Rees protocol.
• Key Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and for all j ≤ size with D[j].type = skse:
If D[j] was created by MORT in Step 2.19 and, with the notation of Algorithm 2, we have that y3 = u
and y4 = v in the current execution of MORT , then D[j].hndw 6= ↓ implies w ∈ {u, v,T}.
Formally, the invariance of the above statements is captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1 The statements correct nonce owner, unique nonce use, nonce secrecy, nonce-list secrecy,
correct list owner, and key secrecy are invariants of SysOR,id, i.e., they hold at all times in all runs of
{MORu | u ∈ H ∪ {T}} ∪ {THH,H,A} for all H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, all users H and all adversaries A. ✷
The proof is postponed to Appendix A.
5.2 Proof of the Ideal Part of Theorem 4.1
For the proof of the ideal part of Theorem 4.1, the following property of THH proven in [22] will be useful.
Lemma 5.2 The ideal cryptographic library Syscry,id has the following property: The only modifications
to existing entries x in D are assignments to previously undefined attributes x.hndu (except for counter
updates in entries for signature keys, which we do not have to consider here), and appending new elements
to the list of arguments of symmetric encryptions. ✷
Proof. (Theorem 4.1) Assume that MORu outputs (ok x ,Otway Rees, v, IDhndu , sksehndu ) at KS outu ! for x ∈
{initiator, responder}, u ∈ H and v ∈ {1, . . . , n} at time t3, and set skse ind := D[hndu = sksehndu ].ind .
By definition of Algorithms 1 and 3, this output can only happen in Step 3.28 respectively 3.38, and only
after there was an input (v, u, i,m3hndu ) respectively (v, u, i,m4
hnd
u ) at outu? at a time t2 < t3. Here and in the
sequel we use the notation of Algorithm 1- 3, but we distinguish the variables from its different executions
by an additional superscript indicating the number of the (claimed) received protocol message, here 3 and 4,
and give handles an additional subscript for their owner, here u.
Case 1: Output in Step 3.28. Assume that MORu outputs (ok responder,Otway Rees, v, IDhndu , skse3
hnd
u )
at KS outu ! for u ∈ H and v ∈ {1, . . . , n} in Step 3.28 at time t3. Hence, the execution of Algorithm 3
for this input must have given l(3),3
hnd
u 6= ↓ in Step 3.19, since the algorithm would otherwise abort by
Convention 1 without creating an output.
Let l(3),3ind := D[hndu = l
(3),3hnd
u ].ind . The algorithm further implies D[l(3),3
ind
].type = list. Let
y3i
ind
:= D[l(3),3
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2 at the time of Step 3.20. By definition of list proj and since the
condition of Step 3.22 is false, we have
y3
hnd
1,u = D[y
3
1
ind
].hndu at time t3, (1)
(y3
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd, v, 3) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[y
3
2
ind
].type = skse at time t3, (2)
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and
(y3
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd, v, 2) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[y
3
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2. (3)
Case 2: Output in Step 3.38. This case is similar to the first one: Assume that MORu outputs
(ok initiator,Otway Rees, v, IDhndu , skse
4hnd
u ) at KS outu ! for u ∈ H and v ∈ {1, . . . , n} in Step 3.38
at time t3. The execution of Algorithm 3 for this input must have given l(2),4
hnd
u 6= ↓ in Step 3.31, since it
would otherwise abort by Convention 1 without creating an output. Let l(2),4ind := D[hndu = l(2),4
hnd
u ].ind ,
where the algorithm implies D[l(2),4ind].type = list. Let x4i
ind
:= D[l(2),4
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2 at the time
of Step 3.32. By definition of list proj and because of the conditions of Step 3.29 and 3.34, we have
x4
hnd
1,u = D[x
4
1
ind
].hndu at time t3, (4)
(x4
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd
u , v, 4) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
4
2
ind
].type = skse at time t3, (5)
and
(x4
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd
u , v, 1) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
4
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2. (6)
This first part of the proof shows that MORu has received a list corresponding to a third or fourth protocol
message. Now we apply correct list owner to the list entry D[l(3),3ind] for the first case respectively to
D[l(2),4
ind
] for the second case to show that this entry was created by MORT .
Proof. (cont’d) Equations (1) and (2) respectively Equations (4) and (5) are the preconditions for Part b)
of correct list owner. Hence the entry D[l(3),3ind] was created by MORT in Step 2.20 respectively the entry
D[l(2),4
ind
] was created by MORT in Step 2.22.
In both cases, the algorithm execution must have started with an input (w,T, i,m2hndT ) at outT? at a
time t1 < t2 with w ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We conclude l(3),2
hnd
T 6= ↓ in Step 2.4 because of Convention 1, set
l(3),2
ind
:= D[hndT = l
(3),2hnd
T ].ind , and obtain D[l(3),2
ind
].type = list. Correct list owner furthermore
implies D[hndT = ID2
hnd
T ] = D[hndu = ID
hnd
u ]. Let y2i
ind
:= D[l(3),2
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at the
time of Step 2.5.
As the condition of Step 2.7 is false immediately afterwards, we obtain y2hndi,T 6= ↓ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The definition of list proj and Lemma 5.2 imply
y2
hnd
i,T = D[y
2
i
ind
].hndT for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} at time t3. (7)
Step 2.7 further ensures y23 ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {w} and y24 = w.
As above, we conclude l(2),2
hnd
T 6= ↓ in Step 2.12, set l(2),2
ind
:= D[hndT = l
(2),2hnd
T ].ind , and obtain
D[l(2),2
ind
].type = list. Let x2i
ind
:= D[l(2),2
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at the time of Step 2.13. As
the condition of Step 2.16 is false immediately afterwards, we obtain x2hndi,T 6= ↓ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The
definition of list proj and Lemma 5.2 again imply
x2
hnd
i,T = D[x
2
i
ind
].hndT for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} at time t3. (8)
Step 2.16 furthermore ensures x23 = y23 and x24 = y24. By definition of the command gen symenc key, we
obtain skse2hndT 6= ↓ in Step 2.19 and set skse2
ind
:= D[hndT = skse
2hnd
T ].ind .
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Now we exploit that MORT creates the entry D[l(3),3
ind
] in Step 3.22 with the input list(y2hnd1,T , skse
2hnd
T )
respectively the entry D[l(2),4ind] in Step 2.20 with the input list(x2hnd1,T , skse
2hnd
T ). With the definitions of list
and list proj, and with Equations (7) and (8), this implies y21 ind = y31 ind and skseind = y32 ind = y22 ind =
skse2
ind
respectively x21
ind
= x31
ind
and skseind = x42
ind
= x22
ind
= skse2
ind
. Thus Equations (1) and (3)
imply
(y2
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd
u , v, 2) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[y
2
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2 (9)
respectively Equations (4) and (6) imply
(x2
hnd
1,u , ID
hnd
u , v, 1) ∈ Nonceu ∧D[x
2
2
ind
].type = skse at time t2. (10)
We are now ready to show symbolic secrecy of the exchanged keys, i.e., to derive that the terms selected by
seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR are symbolically unused symmetric keys that have further-
more not been used for encryption yet.
Proof. (cont’d, secrecy requirement) With the notation of the previous proof, assume additionally that
v ∈ H. Together with Equation 9 and Equation 10, nonce-list secrecy applied to the entry D[l(3),3ind]
respectively D[l(2),4ind] now immediately implies that {y23 , y24} = {u, v} respectively {x23, x24} = {u, v}.
This gives the precondition to apply key secrecy to the entry D[skse2ind], which implies D[skse2ind].hnd a =
↓. Because of skse2ind = skseind we have D[skse2ind].hnd a = D[skseind].hnd a = ↓, i.e., the term under
(u, sksehndu ) is symbolically unknown. Moreover Equation 9 and Equation 10 imply D[skseind].type =
D[skse2
ind
].type = skse, i.e., the term under (u, sksehndu ) is a symmetric key.
It remains to show that the key is unused at time t3. The only way to create an entry D[j] with
D[j].type = symenc and D[j].arg [2] = skseind − 1 is by inputting a command sym encrypt at port inw?
such that D[skseind].hndw 6= ↓. Since we have shown that D[skseind].hndw 6= ↓ only if w ∈ {u, v,T}, it
remains to show that neither of them enters such a command until time t3. By inspection of Algorithm 2,
this clearly holds for T, since this may only happen in Steps 2.21 or 2.23. In both cases, the key used is
one of those that were initially distributed, i.e., D[j].arg [2] = sksew − 1 for some w ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since
we have shown that each key selected by seckeys initiator OR or seckeys responder OR is newly generated
by MORT , we in particular have sksew 6= skse
ind
. Similar reasoning can be applied to Algorithm 1 and 3 of
MORu to show that the only used keys are the ones shared between u and T respectively between v and T.
It remains to show the consistency requirement ReqSec.
Proof. (cont’d, consistency requirement) Assume that MORu outputs
(ok initiator,Otway Rees, v, IDhndu , skse
hnd
u ) at KS outu ! at time t3 and that MORv outputs
(ok responder,Otway Rees, w, IDhndv , skse
hnd
v ) at KS outv ! at time t′3 for u, v ∈ H and w ∈ {1, . . . , n},
and let t3 : D[hndu = IDhndu ] = t′3 : D[hndv = IDhndv ]. We again use the notation of the main proof.
To show the left-to-right direction of the consistency property, assume that u = w. Let skse indu :=
D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ].ind and skse indv := D[hndv = sksehndv ].ind . Now the main proof immediately yields
D[hndu = ID
hnd
u ] = D[hndT = ID
2hnd
T ] = D[hndv = ID
hnd
v ], i.e., both D[skse indu ] and D[skse indu ] have
been created in an execution of MT with the same handle IDhndT . Because of the check in Step 2.7 and
because of Step 2.10 both entries must have been created in the same execution, which immediately implies
t3 : D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ] = t
′
3 : D[hnd v = skse
hnd
v ], and we are done.
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To show the right-to-left direction, assume that t3 : D[hndu = sksehndu ] = t′3 : D[hndv = sksehndv ]
holds. We have already shown that
D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ].hnd z 6= ↓ =⇒ z ∈ {u, v,T}. (11)
Hence only u, v, and T can get a handle to D[hnd v = sksehndv ].
We first show that if w also got a handle to D[hnd v = sksehndv ] then u = w trivially holds. Because of
D[hndu = skse
hnd
u ].hnd z 6= ↓ only if z ∈ {u, v,T}, we conclude w ∈ {u, v,T}. Hence it remains to show
w 6∈ {v,T}. However, the output (ok,Otway Rees, w, IDhndv , sksehndv ) may only occur if the checks in
Step 3.22 or 3.29 succeeded, which ensures that (·, ·, w, ·) ∈ Noncev immediately before time t′3. Consider
the first time that an element containing w as its third component was entered into Noncev. This could either
happen in Step 1.3 or in Step 3.9. In both cases however, we obtain w ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {v} by definition of
Algorithm 1 and 3, hence we have u = w as desired.
To conclude the proof, we have to consider those cases where w does not get a handle to D[hndv =
sksehndv ]. We show that if an honest v outputs (ok,Otway Rees, w, IDhndv , sksehndv ), then the adversary
can ensure that w gets a handle to D[hnd v = sksehndv ] (i.e., that there exists an adversary that sched-
ules messages in a way that gives w this handle), and hence we obtain u = w as in the previous case.
The existence of such an adversary is intuitively clear and technically follows immediately from the main
proof: We have that the entry D[hndv = sksehndv ] was created by MORT , and assume that MORT out-
puts send i(w′,mhnd3 ) in Step 2.25 for some w′. Let m3
ind
:= D[hndT = m
hnd
3 ]. We can assume that
w′ ∈ H as the adversary would otherwise obtain a handle to D[hndu = sksehndu ], which would yield a
contradiction to Equation 11. As shown in the proof of the secrecy property, nonce-list secrecy implies
w′ ∈ {v,w}, hence either the second component or the third component of D[m3ind] is an encryption
with the key that w shares with T. The command send i gives the adversary a handle mhnd3,a to m3
ind
, i.e.,
mhnd3,a := D[m
3ind].hnd a. If w = w′ (which means that w will be able to decrypt the third component of
D[m3
ind
]), the adversary forwards mhnd3 to w. (Formally, it inputs adv send i(w,T,mhnd3,a ) at ina?.) The
machine MORw will then obtain a handle to D[hnd v = sksehndv ] in Step 3.20, where the correctness of the
previous decryption step follows as in the main proof. If w 6= w′, i.e., w will be able to decrypt the sec-
ond component of m3ind, the adversary first determines handles to the first two components of m3ind by
means of the command list proj, i.e., IDhnda ← list proj(mhnd3,a , 1) and c
(2)hnd
3,a ← list proj(m
hnd
3,a , 2). It then
creates a message mhnd ← list(IDhnda , c
(2)hnd
3,a ) and sends mhnd to w claiming to be v. (Formally, the in-
put is adv send i(w, v,mhnd). Similar to the previous case, the machine MORw will then obtain a handle to
D[hndv = skse
hnd
v ], but now in Step 3.32.
6 Proof of the Cryptographic Realization
If Theorem 4.1 has been proven, it remains to show that the Otway-Rees protocol based on the real cryp-
tographic library computationally fulfills corresponding secrecy and consistency requirements. Obviously,
carrying over properties from the ideal to the real system crucially relies on the fact that the real crypto-
graphic library is at least as secure as the ideal one. As briefly sketched in the introduction, this has been
established in [22, 16], but only subject to the side condition that the surrounding protocol, i.e., the Otway-
Rees protocol in our case, does not raise a so-called commitment problem. Establishing this side condition is
crucial for using symmetric encryption in abstract, cryptographically sound proofs. We explain the commit-
ment problem in detail in the next section to illustrate the cryptographic issue underlying the commitment
problem, and we exploit the invariants of Section 5 to show that the commitment problem does not occur
for the Otway-Rees protocol. As our proof is the first Dolev-Yao-style, computationally sound proof of a
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protocol that uses symmetric encryption, our result also shows that the commitment problem, and hence
also symmetric encryption, can be conveniently dealt with in cryptographically sound proofs of security by
means of the approach of [16].
For technical reasons, one further has to ensure that the surrounding protocol does not create “encryption
cycles” (such as encrypting a key with itself), which had to be required even for acquiring properties weaker
than simulatability, cf. [3] for further discussions. This property is only a technical subtlety and clearly holds
for the Otway-Rees protocol.
6.1 Absence of the Commitment Problem for the Otway-Rees Protocol
As the name suggests, a “commitment problem” in simulatability proofs captures a situation where the sim-
ulator commits itself to a certain message and later has to change this commitment to allow for a correct
simulation. In the case of symmetric encryption, the commitment problem occurs if the simulator learns
in some abstract way that a ciphertext was sent and hence has to construct an indistinguishable ciphertext,
knowing neither the secret key nor the plaintext used for the corresponding ciphertext in the real world. To
simulate the missing key, the simulator will create a new secret key, or rely on an arbitrary, fixed key if the
encryption systems guarantees indistinguishable keys, see [3]. Instead of the unknown plaintext, the simula-
tor will encrypt an arbitrary message of the correct length, relying on the indistinguishability of ciphertexts
of different messages. So far, the simulation is fine. It even stays fine if the message becomes known later
because secure encryption still guarantees that it is indistinguishable that the simulator’s ciphertext contains
a wrong message. However, if the secret key becomes known later, the simulator runs into trouble, because,
learning abstractly about this fact, it has to produce a suitable key that decrypts its ciphertext into the correct
message. It cannot cheat with the message because it has to produce the correct behavior towards the honest
users. This is typically not possible.
The solution for this problem taken in [16] for the cryptographic library is to leave it to the surrounding
protocol to guarantee that the commitment problem does not occur, i.e., the surrounding protocol must
guarantee that keys are no longer sent in a form that might make them known to the adversary once an
honest participant has started using them. To exploit the simulatability results of [16], we hence have to
prove this condition for the Otway-Rees protocol. Formally, we have to show that the following property
NoComm does not occur: “If there exists an input from an honest user that causes a symmetric encryption
to be generated such that the corresponding key is not known to the adversary, then future inputs may only
cause this key to be sent within an encryption that cannot be decrypted by the adversary”. This event can be
rigorously defined in the style of the secrecy and consistency property but we omit the rigorous definition due
to space constraints and refer to [16]. The event NoComm is equivalent to the event “if there exists an input
from an honest user that causes a symmetric encryption to be generated such that the corresponding key is
not known to the adversary, the adversary never gets a handle to this key” but NoComm has the advantage
that it can easily be inferred from the abstract protocol description without presupposing knowledge about
handles of the cryptographic library. For the Otway-Rees protocol the event NoComm can easily be verified
by inspection of the abstract protocol description, and a detailed proof based on Algorithms 1-3 can also
easily be performed by exploiting the invariants of Section 5.
Lemma 6.1 (Absence of the Commitment Problem for the Otway-Rees Protocol) The ideal Otway-Rees
system SysOR,id perfectly fulfills the property NoComm, i.e., SysOR,id |=perf NoComm. ✷
Proof. Note first that the secret key shared initially between a user and the trusted third party will never be
sent by definition in case the user is honest, and it is already known to the adversary when it is first used in
case of a dishonest user. The interesting cases are thus the keys generated by the trusted third party in the
protocol sessions.
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Let j ≤ size , D[j].type = skse such that D[j] was created by MORT in Step 2.19, where, with the
notation of Algorithm 2, we have y3 = u and y4 = v for y3, y4 ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If u or v were dishonest,
then the adversary would get a handle for D[j] after MORT finishes its execution, i.e., in particular before
D[j] has been used for encryption for the first time, since the adversary knows the keys shared between the
dishonest users and the trusted third party. If both u and v are honest, key secrecy then immediately implies
that t : D[j].hnd a = ↓ for all t ∈ N, which finishes the proof.
6.2 Proof of Real-or-random Secrecy and Computational Consistency
As the final step in the overall security proof, we show how to derive corresponding secrecy and consistency
properties from the proofs in the ideal setting and the simulatability result of the underlying library. In
particular, we derive cryptographic, real-or-random key secrecy as well as computational fulfillment of the
consistency property.
Once we have shown that the considered keys are symbolically secret and that the commitment problem
does not occur for the Otway-Rees protocol, we can exploit the following key-secrecy preservation theorem:
Theorem 6.1 (Symbolic Key Secrecy Implies Cryptographic Key Secrecy [18]) Let a polynomial-time hon-
est user H of a structure ({THH},SH) of the ideal cryptographic library and a secret-key belief function
seckeys for H be given such that the cryptographic library with this user keeps the keys in seckeys strictly
symbolically secret. Then every polynomial-time configuration (MˆH,SH,H,A) of the real cryptographic
library (with the same user H) keeps the keys in seckeys cryptographically secret. ✷
It is easy to show that this theorem implies the cryptographic secrecy part of Theorem 4.1 once the ideal,
symbolic part has already been shown: We have shown in Section 5 that the ideal Otway-Rees proto-
col keeps the keys of honest users strictly symbolically secret, i.e., the cryptographic library with user
H∗ denoting the combination of {H} ∪ {MORu | u ∈ H} keeps the keys in seckeys initiator OR and
seckeys responder OR strictly symbolically secret. Hence Theorem 6.1 implies that every polynomial-time
configuration (MˆH,SH,H∗,A) of the real cryptographic library keeps the keys in seckeys initiator OR and
seckeys responder OR cryptographically secret, and thus that the every polynomial-time configurations of
SysOR,real keeps the exchanged keys of honest users cryptographically secret.
We only briefly sketch how to derive ReqConsreal from the the ideal counterpart since the proofs contains
requires slightly more knowledge about the underlying proof of soundness of the cryptographic library [22,
16]: One first exploits that the real and ideal consistency properties closely resemble so-called integrity
properties in the sense of [10]. Integrity properties correspond to sets of traces at the in- and output ports
connecting the system to the honest users, i.e., properties that can be expressed solely via statements about
events at the port set SH; in particular, integrity property hence do not rely on the state of the underlying
machine. Integrity properties are preserved under simulatability, i.e., they carry over from the ideal to the
real system without any additional work. Formally, the following preservation theorem has been established
in [10].
Theorem 6.2 (Preservation of Integrity Properties (Sketch)) Let two systems Sys1, Sys2 be given such that
Sys1 is at least as secure as Sys2 (written Sys1 ≥polysec Sys2). Let Req be an integrity property for both Sys1
and Sys2, and let Sys2 |=poly Req . Then also Sys1 |=poly Req . ✷
Note that this theorem would allow us to derive ReqConsreal from its ideal counterparts, provided that we
can somehow link the statements involving the state of the ideal and real cryptographic library, i.e., the
statements t1 : D[hndu = sksehndu ] = t2 : D[hndv = skse
hnd
v and t1 : Du[hndu = sksehndu ].word =
t2 : Dv[hndv = skse
hnd
v ].word . If one looks at the underlying proof of soundness of the cryptographic
library, there exists a so-called combined system that links state parts of the real library to state parts of the
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ideal library. In particular, we obtain that if the real Otway-Rees protocol is run with an arbitrary adversary
and if we have t1 : D[hndu = sksehndu ] = t2 : D[hndv = sksehndv ] then there always exist an adversary
against the ideal Otway-Rees protocol such that t1 : Du[hndu = sksehndu ].word = t2 : Dv [hndu =
sksehndu ].word . Together with the aforementioned integrity preservation theorem, this shows that the real
Otway-Rees protocol computationally fulfills ReqConsreal and hence finishes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
7 Conclusion
We have proven the Otway-Rees protocol in the real cryptographic setting via a deterministic, provably se-
cure abstraction of a real cryptographic library. Together with composition and preservation theorems from
the underlying model, this library allowed us to perform the actual proof effort in a deterministic setting
corresponding to a slightly extended Dolev-Yao model. In particular, we prove real-or-random secrecy of
the exchanged keys, i.e., no polynomial-time adversary attacking the protocol is able to distinguish fresh,
random keys and keys that are actually exchanged in the protocol. Besides establishing the cryptographic
security of the Otway-Rees protocol, our result also serves an an exemplification of the potential of the
cryptographic library and the recent secrecy preservation theorem for symbolic, automated, and crypto-
graphically sound proofs of security protocols.
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A Proof of the Invariants
A.1 Correct Nonce Owner and Unique Nonce Use
We start with the proof of correct nonce owner.
Proof. (Correct nonce owner) Let (xhnd, ·, v, j) ∈ Nonceu for u ∈ H, v ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
By construction, this entry has been added to Nonceu by MORu in Step 1.3, Step 3.9, Step 1.25, or Step 1.37.
In the last two cases, the entry (xhnd, ·, v, j − 1) respectively (xhnd, ·, v, j − 3) was already contained in
Nonceu (for the same handle xhnd and the same identity v) hence it is sufficient to consider the first two
cases. In both cases xhnd has been generated by the command gen nonce() at some time t, input at port inu?
of THH. Convention 1 implies xhnd 6= ↓, as MORu would abort otherwise and not add the entry to the set
Nonceu. The definition of gen nonce then implies D[hndu = xhnd] 6= ↓ and D[hndu = xhnd].type = nonce
at time t. Because of Lemma 5.2 this also holds at all later times t′ > t, which finishes the proof.
The following proof of unique nonce use is quite similar.
Proof. (Unique Nonce Use) Assume for contradiction that both x1 := (D[j].hndu , ·, w, ·) ∈ Nonceu
and x2 := (D[j].hndv , ·, w′, l) ∈ Noncev at some time t. Without loss of generality, let t be the first
such time and let x2 6∈ Noncev at time t − 1. By construction, x2 is thus added to Noncev at time t by
Step 1.3, Step 3.9, Step 1.25, or Step 1.37. In the last two cases, the entry (xhnd, ·, w′, l − 1) respectively
(xhnd, ·, w′, l − 3) was already contained in Nonceu (for the same handle xhnd and the same identity w′)
hence it is sufficient to consider the first two cases. In both cases, D[j].hndv has been generated by the
command gen nonce() at time t − 1. The definition of gen nonce implies that D[j] is a new entry and
D[j].hndv its only handle at time t − 1, and thus also at time t. With correct nonce owner this implies
u = v. Further, x2 = (D[j].hndv , ·, w′, l) is the only entry that is put into Noncev at times t−1 and t. Thus
also w = w′. This is a contradiction.
A.2 Correct List Owner
In the following subsections, we prove correct list owner, nonce secrecy, key secrecy, and nonce-list secrecy
by induction. Hence assume that all three invariants hold at a particular time t in a run of the system, and
we have to show that they still hold at time t+ 1.
Proof. (Correct list owner) Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with D[j].type = list. Let x indi := D[j].arg [i] for
i = 1, 2 and xhnd1,u := D[x ind1 ].hndu , and assume that (xhnd1,u , IDhndu , v, l) ∈ Nonceu at time t+ 1.
The only possibilities to violate the invariant correct list owner are that (1) the entry D[j] is created at
time t+1 or that (2) the handle D[j].hndu is created at time t+1 for an entry D[j] that already exists at time
t or that (3) the entry (xhnd1,u , IDhndu , v, l) is added to Nonceu at time t + 1. In all other cases the invariant
holds by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 5.2.
We start with the third case. Assume that (xhnd1,u , IDhndu , v, l) is added to Nonceu at time t + 1. By
construction, this only happens in a transition of MORu in Step 1.3, 3.9, 3.25, and 3.37. However, in the first
two subcases, the entry D[x ind1 ] has been generated by the command gen nonce input at inu? immediately
before, hence x ind1 cannot be contained as an argument of an entry D[j] at time t. Formally, this corresponds
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to the fact that D is well-formed [22]. Since a transition of MORu does not modify entries in THH, this also
holds at time t+1. For the latter two cases, note that Step 3.22 and Step 3.29 ensure that (xhnd1,u , IDhndu , v, 2) ∈
Nonceu respectively (xhnd1,u , IDhndu , v, 1) ∈ Nonceu already at time t. Hence the claim follows by induction
hypothesis and from the previous two subcases.
For proving the remaining two cases, assume that D[j].hndu is created at time t + 1 for an already
existing entry D[j] or that D[j] is generated at time t+ 1. Because both can only happen in a transition of
THH, this implies (xhnd1,u , IDhndu , v, l) ∈ Nonceu already at time t, since transitions of THH cannot modify
the set Nonceu. Because of u, v ∈ H, nonce secrecy implies D[x indi ].hndw 6= ↓ only if w ∈ {u, v,T}.
Lists can only be constructed by the basic command list, which requires handles to all its elements. More
precisely, if w ∈ H ∪ {a,T} creates an entry D[j′] with D[j′].type = list and (x′1, . . . , x′k) := D[j].arg at
time t+ 1 then D[x′i].hndw 6= ↓ for i = 1, . . . , k already at time t. Applied to the entry D[j], this implies
that either u, v, or T have created the entry D[j].
We now only have to show that the entry D[j] has been created by u in the claimed steps. This can easily
be seen by inspection of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3. We only show it in detail for the first part of the invariant; it
can be proven similarly for the second part where the claim about the session identifier immediately follows
from the proof.
Let (xhnd1,u , ID
hnd
u , v, l) ∈ Nonceu for l ∈ {1, 2} and D[x ind2 ].type = nonce. By inspection of Algo-
rithms 1, 2, and 3 and because D[j].type = list, we see that the entry D[j] must have been created by
either MORu or MORv in Step 1.6 if l = 1 or in Step 3.12. (The remaining list generation commands always
have D[x ind2 ].type ∈ {skse, symenc} by construction.) This already implies that the entry D[j] has not been
generated by T. Now assume for contradiction that the entry D[j] has been generated by MORv . This implies
that also the entry D[x ind1 ] has been newly generated by the command gen nonce input at inv?. However,
only MORu can add elements to the set Nonceu (it is the local state of MORu ), but if an entry (xhnd1,u , ·, ·, ·) is
added to the set Nonceu by MORu , then xhnd1,u has been newly generated by the command gen nonce input
by MORu by construction. This implies (xhnd1,u , ·, ·, ·) 6∈ Nonceu at all times, which yields a contradiction to
xhnd1,u ∈ Nonceu at time t+ 1. Hence D[j] has been created by user u.
A.3 Nonce Secrecy
Proof. (Nonce secrecy) Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with x := (D[j].hndu , IDhnd, v, l) ∈ Nonceu, and
w ∈ (H ∪ {a}) \ {u, v} be given. Because of correct nonce owner, we know that D[j].type = nonce. The
invariant could only be affected if (1) x is put into the set Nonceu at time t + 1 or (2) if a handle for w is
added to the entry D[j] at time t+ 1.
For proving the first case, note that the set Nonceu is only extended by an entry x by MORu in Steps 1.3
and 3.9 (again the modifications of Nonceu in Steps 3.25 and 3.37 do not have to be considered since
an entry (D[j].hndu , IDhnd, v, l − 1) respectively (D[j].hndu , IDhnd, v, l − 3) already existed in Nonceu
before, which is ensured by the checks in Steps 3.22, 3.29, and 3.34). In both cases, D[j].hndu has been
generated by THH at time t since the command gen nonce was input at inu? at time t. The definition of
gen nonce immediately implies that D[j].hndw = ↓ at time t if w 6= u. Moreover, this also holds at time
t+ 1 since a transition of MORu does not modify handles in THH, which finishes the claim for this case.
For proving the second case, we only have to consider those commands that add handles for w to entries
of type nonce. These are only the commands list proj or adv parse input at inw?, where adv parse has to
be applied to an entry of type list, since only entries of type list can have arguments which are indices to
nonce entries. More precisely, if one of the commands violated the invariant there would exist an entry D[i]
at time t such that D[i].type = list, D[i].hndw 6= ↓ and j ∈ (x ind1 , . . . , x indm ) := D[i].arg . However, both
commands do not modify the set Nonceu, hence we have x ∈ Nonceu already at time t. Now nonce secrecy
yields D[j].hndw = ↓ at time t and hence also at all times < t because of Lemma 5.2. This implies that
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the entry D[i] must have been created by either u or v, since generating a list presupposes handles for all
elements (cf. the previous proof). Assume without loss of generality that D[i] has been generated by u. By
inspection of Algorithms 1 and 3, this immediately implies j = x ind1 , since such handles only occur as first
element in a list generation by u. Because of j = D[i].arg [1] and (D[j].hndu , ·, v, ·) ∈ Nonceu at time t,
nonce-list secrecy for the entry D[i] implies that D[i].hndw = ↓ at time t. This yields a contradiction.
A.4 Key Secrecy
Proof. (Key Secrecy) Let j ≤ size ,D[j].type = skse such that D[j] was created by MORT in Step 2.19, where,
with the notation of algorithm 2, we have y3 = u and y4 = v for honest u, v. Now the message output in
Step 2.25 maintains the entry D[j] within an encryption with sksehndT,u and one with sksehndT,v . By assumption,
these keys are shared between u and T respectively v and T, and they are never sent. The definition of the
command sym decrypt implies that only u and T respectively v and T can get a handle to the entry D[j]
out of these encryptions. Such a decryption could only happen in Steps 3.19 and 3.31 yielding handles
l(3)
hnd
respectively l(2)hnd . Let y1 := D[hndu = l(3)
hnd
].arg [1], yhnd1 := D[y1].hndu , and x1 := D[hndu =
l(2)
hnd
].arg [2], xhnd1 := D[x1].hndu . In both cases, the checks in Step 3.22 respectively in Step 3.29 and
3.34 imply (yhnd1 , IDhnd, w, 2) ∈ Nonceu respectively (xhnd1 , IDhnd, w, 1) ∈ Nonceu as otherwise MORu
would abort the current transition without updating its state and without producing any output. Now nonce-
list secrecy immediately implies that D[hndu = l(2)
hnd
].hnd a = D[hndu = l
(3)hnd ].hnd a = ↓. Since u,
v, and T only send the entry D[j] as an argument of D[hndu = l(2)
hnd
] or D[hndu = l
(2)hnd ], we obtain
D[j].hnd a = ↓, which finishes the proof.
A.5 Nonce-List Secrecy
Proof. (Nonce-list secrecy) Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with D[j].type = list. Let x indi := D[j].arg [i] and
xhndi,u := D[x
ind
i ].hndu for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and w ∈ (H ∪ {a}) \ {u, v}. Let xhnd1,u ∈ Nonceu,v.
We first show that the invariant cannot be violated by adding an element (xhndi,u , IDhndu , v, l) to Nonceu
at time t+ 1. This can only happen in a transition of MORu in Step 1.3, 3.9, 3.25, or 3.37. As shown in the
proof of correct list owner, in the first two cases, we have l ∈ {1, 2} and that the entry D[x indi ] has been
generated by THH immediately before and hence that x indi 6∈ D[j].arg for all entries D[j] that already exist
at time t+1. This also holds for all entries at time t+1, since the transition of MORu does not modify entries
of THH. This yields a contradiction to x indi = D[j].arg [i]. In the last two cases, Step 3.22 and Step 3.29
ensure that (xhnd1,u , IDhndu , v, 2) ∈ Nonceu respectively (xhnd1,u , IDhndu , v, 1) ∈ Nonceu already at time t. In
all cases, we hence know that (xhndi,u , IDhndu , v, l) ∈ Nonceu for l ∈ {1, 2} already holds at time t.
Part a) of the invariant can only be affected if a handle for w is added to an entry D[j] that already exists
at time t. (Creation of D[j] at time t with a handle for w is impossible as above because that presupposes
handles to all arguments, in contradiction to nonce secrecy.) The only commands that add new handles for
w to existing entries of type list are list proj, sym decrypt, adv parse, send i, and adv send i applied to an
entry D[k] with j ∈ D[k].arg . Nonce-list secrecy for the entry D[j] at time t then yields D[k].type = enc.
Thus the commands list proj, send i, and adv send i do not have to be considered any further. Moreover,
nonce-list secrecy also yields D[k].arg [1] ∈ {pkseu, pksev}. The secret keys shared between u and T
respectively v and T are not known to w 6∈ {u, v,T}, formally D[hndu = sksehndu ].hndw = D[hndv =
sksehndv ].hndw = ↓. Hence the command sym decrypt does not violate the invariant. Finally, the command
adv parse applied to an entry of type symenc with unknown secret key also does not give a handle to the
cleartext list, i.e., to D[k].arg [2], but only outputs its length.
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Part b) and c) of the invariant can only be affected if the list entry D[j] is created at time t + 1. (By
well-formedness, the argument entry D[x ind3 ] cannot be created after D[j].) As in Part a), it can only be
created by a party w ∈ {u, v,T} because other parties have no handle to the nonce argument. Inspection of
Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 shows that this can only happen in Steps 1.6 and 3.12, because for all other commands
list we have D[x ind3 ].type 6= data which would violate the precondition.
• If the creation is in Step 1.6, the preceding Step 1.3 implies (D[x ind1 ].hndw , IDhnd, w′, 1) ∈ Noncew
for some w′ and some IDhnd and Step 1.4 implies D[x ind3 ].type = data. Thus the precondition
(D[x ind1 ].hndu , ID
hnd, v, 1) ∈ Nonceu and unique nonce use then imply u = w. Thus Steps 1.4, 1.5,
and 1.6 yield D[x ind3 ].arg = (u) and D[x ind4 ].arg = (v).
• If the creation is in Step 3.12, the proof is analogous: The preceding Step 3.9 implies
(D[x ind1 ].hndw , ID
hnd, w′, 2) ∈ Noncew for some w′ and some IDhnd and Step 3.11 implies
D[x ind3 ].type = data. Then the precondition, Step 3.9, and unique nonce use imply u = w. Fi-
nally, Steps 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 yield D[x ind3 ].arg = (v) and D[x ind4 ].arg = (u).
Part d) of the invariant can only be violated if a new entry D[k] is created at time t+1 with j ∈ D[k].arg
(by Lemma 5.2 and well-formedness). As D[j] already exists at time t, nonce-list secrecy for D[j] implies
D[j].hndw = ↓ for w 6∈ {u, v,T} at time t. We can easily see by inspection of the commands that the new
entry D[k] must have been created by one of the commands list and sym encrypt, since entries newly created
by other commands cannot have arguments that are indices of entries of type list. Since all these commands
entered at a port inz ? presuppose D[j].hndz 6= ↓, the entry D[k] is created by w ∈ {u, v,T} at time t + 1.
However, the only steps that can create an entry D[k] with j ∈ D[k].arg (with the properties demanded
for the entry D[j]) are Steps 1.7, 3.13, 2.21, and 2.23. In all these cases, we have D[k].type = symenc.
Further, we have D[k].arg [1] = pksew′ where w′ denotes w’s current believed partner. We have to show
that w′ ∈ {u, v}.
• Case 1: D[k] is created in Step 1.7. Then our precondition (D[x ind1 ].hndu , IDhndu , v, l) ∈ Nonceu and
(D[x ind1 ].hndw , ID
′hnd
u , w
′, l′) ∈ Noncew for some ID ′hndu , l′ and unique nonce use imply w′ = v.
• Case 2: D[k] is created in Step 3.13. This execution of Algorithm 3 must give l(3)
hnd
2 6= ↓ in Step 3.12,
since it would otherwise abort by Convention 1. Let l(3)2
ind
:= D[hndw = l
(3)hnd
2 ].ind . The algorithm
further implies D[l(3)2
ind
].type = list. Let x0i
ind
:= D[l
(3)
2
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at the time of
Step 3.12, and let x0hndi,w be the corresponding handles obtained in Step 3.1, 3.8, 3.11, and 3.10. As the
algorithm does not abort in Steps 3.3 and 3.6, we have D[x03
ind
].type = data and D[x03
ind
].arg = (w′).
Together with the precondition (D[x01
ind
].hndu , ·, v, l) ∈ Nonceu, the entry D[l(3)2
ind
] therefore fulfills
the conditions of nonce-list secrecy. This implies D[x02
ind
].arg ∈ {u, v}, and thus w′ ∈ {u, v}.
• Case 3: D[k] is created in Step 2.21 or Step 2.23. As in Case 3, this execution of Algorithm 2 must
give l(3)hnd 6= ↓ in Step 2.4 and l(2)hnd 6= ↓ in Step 2.12. We set l(3)ind := D[hndw = l(3)
hnd
].ind and
l(2)
ind
:= D[hndw = l
(2)hnd ].ind , and we have D[l(3)ind].type = D[l(2)ind].type = list.
Let y0i
ind
:= D[l(3)
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at the time of Step 2.5, and let y0hndi,w be the handles
obtained in Step 2.5. Let further x0i
ind
:= D[l(2)
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 at the time of Step 2.13,
and let x0hndi,w be the handles obtained in Step 2.13.
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As the algorithm does not abort in Steps 2.7 and 2.16, we have D[y03
ind
].type = D[y04
ind
].type =
D[x03
ind
].type = D[x04
ind
].type = data and D[x04
ind
].arg = D[y04
ind
].arg = (w′). Further, the reuse
of x0hnd1,w in Step 2.20 implies x01
ind
= x ind1 . Similarly, we obtain y01
ind
= y ind1 because of Step 2.22.
Together with the precondition (D[x ind1 ].hndu , IDhnd, v, l) ∈ Nonceu, the entry D[l(3)
ind
] respec-
tively D[l(2)ind] therefore fulfills the condition of nonce-list secrecy. This implies D[y03
ind
].arg ∈
{u, v} respectively D[y03
ind
].arg ∈ {u, v}, and thus w′ ∈ {u, v}.
Hence in all cases we obtained w′ ∈ {u, v}, i.e., the list containing the nonce was indeed encrypted with the
key that one of the intended honest participants shared with the trusted third party.
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